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CHAPTER 5
THE KNOWLEDGE INTENSITY OF EUREKA PROJECTS
INTRODUCTION
In spite of the number and magnitude of the risks involved in R&D interaction
between industrial firms and research institutes such cooperation has increasingly
become the norm (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989). Moreover, the boundaries
between the contexts of industrial R&D and university and governmental R&D
have become blurred. For example the new category of strategic scientific research
(fundamental research, but on fields that are potentially of economic relevance),
has emerged; linking the interests of fundamental and industrial scientists. In
addition, all publicly funded research systems have been influenced by financial
cutbacks. This has resulted in a reorientation towards other (industrial) funding
sources.
Simultaneously, the nature of the interaction between industrial firms and research
institutes has changed. Whereas formerly the interaction was incidental (research
contracts for particular projects), today, the interaction quite often involves long
term contracts, formulated such that different types of services can be offered.
These changes are, of course, related to changes in the expectations industrial
firms have of the nature of the services that should be provided by research
institutes.
Considered from the perspective of the industrial firm, this increase in R&D
interaction is not a self-evident development. R&D cooperation between industrial
firms and research institutes involves specific risks.
First of all, R&D cooperation with research institutes increases the risk of R&D
spillover. This refers to the unauthorized use by competitors’ of a firms R&D.
Understandably, cooperating with scientists in research institutes (especially in
university research institutes), increases the possibility that competitors will be
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informed about the problems and fields in which a firm is interested. Scientists,
(especially those in research institutes), need to publish their results in order to
enhance their prestige. Hence, the possibility of informing competitors of the
nature of innovative searches.
Secondly, as Webster and Etzkowitz indicate in their framework paper for the
research workshop on Academic-Industry Relations (Webster and H. Etzkowitz
1991), the process and outcomes of collaborative work between industrial and
(especially) public sector scientists are difficult to predict, because of the mutual
feedback effects of in-house and extramural research:
"Hence it may be difficult to chart and evaluate its specific impact in both the
short and long terms. This in part explains why some companies, having
withdrawn from a collaboration which they regard as unproductive, suddenly find
other companies moving into their place and emerging with commercial products
relatively quickly." (p.19)
Public sector and industrial R&D are differently managed. This can result in the
surprises indicated by Webster and Etzkowitz. This, too, results in extra risks
related to firm/research institute interaction.
Thirdly, and especially with respect to research institutes in the public sector, there
are special problems related to patenting research done at those research institutes.
One of the reasons for industrial firms to do particular projects extramurally, is the
fact that it is more efficient to line up with an existing program elsewhere, than
to develop the total research program in house. But that leads to the problem that
the role of the industrial firm vis-a-vis the research program is always less than
substantial. In such situation it is difficult for industrial firms to claim exclusive
licensing agreements. For instance the US federal government grants " (..)
exclusive licenses only in cases where substantial additional risks, time and costs
must be undertaken by a licensee prior to commercialization" (OTA 1993).
Furthermore, the present tendency to encourage public sector scientists to seek
commercialization of their ideas, instead of reinforcing the interaction of industrial
and public sector scientists, will rather result in both types of scientists considering
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each other as competitors. Consequently, it can be comprehended that this kind of
measures did not result in the (expected) rise of the formal interaction between
government and industrial scientists.
How then should we account for the R&D cooperation of industrial firms and
research institutes? An interesting starting point for this discussion is the account
of the R&D cooperation between research firms. Studies on such cooperation
commence with the assumption that the decision to cooperate is directly related
to strategic and tactical choices of the firm with respect to an innovation. Teece,
for example, analyzes the choices of industrial firms to engage in R&D cooper-
ation with competitors and suppliers (as well as the choices regarding the nature
of the cooperation) in terms of the characteristics of the environment of the
innovation (i.e. the nature of the appropriability regime; the presence or absence
of a dominant design paradigm; and the extent to which complementary assets are
necessary) (Teece 1986). Although his central research question is the reason "(...)
why innovating firms often fail to obtain significant economic returns from an
innovation, while customers, imitators and other industry participants benefit"
(p.285), nevertheless, most of the article is devoted to an analysis of when R&D
cooperation is profitable for a firm.
The analysis makes abundantly clear that, in all cases, the starting point is that the
most profitable situation for a firm is for it to develop its own innovations. Only
in this way can a firm gain all the profits related to an innovation. Because a firm
is, in some cases, unable to do this (due to a weak appropriability regime; the
absence of a dominant design paradigm, or the needs to secure complementary
assets) it must engage in R&D cooperation. This is clearly the case in Katz’s
analysis of research cooperation between (competing) firms. Katz actually
considers research cooperation as a panacea for the risks of R&D spillover (Katz
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1986)7.
Accordingly, also in the case of R&D cooperation between firms and research
institutes, the basic assumption is that, while it is generally more profitable to
develop innovations alone, specific attributes of the environment, c.q the innova-
tion, may make it necessary both to engage in R&D cooperation, and to choose
a particular type of R&D cooperation with research institutes. The theory should
indicate these attributes.
In what situations will industrial firms seek the collaboration of research institutes?
From the point of view of industrial firms, research institutes provide a particular
commodity (i.e. research), which, in some cases, cannot be obtained in-house.
The first situation in which this applies is when industrial firms indirectly need
fundamental research, as a condition for their daily activities, because their
applications depend on it. In such a situation it is clearly too expensive for the
firm to do the fundamental research in-house. This is partly a result of the fact that
the process of performing fundamental research needs a bottom-up style of
management. This is not only different from the management styles in most firms,
but also quite expensive because of the trial-and-error involved. Moreover,
considering the fact that such pre-competitive fundamental research does not
involve R&D spillover risks (the translation to applications must still be done)
there are no reasons why industrial firms would not collaborate with research
institutes to perform such research.
Collaboration in this situation can take a variety of different forms. It can be
7 Research spillover refers to the unauthorized use of R&D of an innovator (e.g. by
working around a patent; or using the product as a starting point for the competitor’s
R&D). Apparently, in Teece’s terms, R&D spillover can only occur in situations where
there is a weak appropriability regime. According to Katz, if such risks are substantial,
it is a better strategy to engage in R&D cooperation with the competitor(s) who are
potential users of the firm’s R&D (Katz 1986).
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organized in a rather informal way, e.g., by exchanging staff (hiring alumni from
particular university research programs or establishing extra-ordinary professor-
ships), or by financial incentives (such as contributions to research programs). In
general no specific contracts will be involved. The collaboration can also become
formalized, for example, in the establishment of mutual research programs, or the
common involvement of the firm and research institute in research programs,
organized and financed by governmental or supranational organizations. The R&D
programmes of the EC (e.g. ESPRIT, BRITE-EURAM etc.) are good examples of
this type of collaboration.
A second situation in which collaboration between industrial firms and research
institutes will occur, is when research institutes have a specific commodity to offer
to firms. According to Malerba, Morawetz and Pasqui (1991):
"Probably the most important type of cooperation is the participation of Govern-
ment laboratories and the Higher Education sector in projects designed to enhance
the innovative capacity and technological development of industry."(p.47)
The authors offer a rich overview of the activities of public laboratories and
contract research organizations in a number of European countries (Italy, France,
Germany, The United Kingdom, Norway and The Netherlands among others). In
this case the research institute acts like a supplier firm, but instead of supplying,
for example, parts of the eventual product, the research institute supplies specific
bits of knowledge. These bits of knowledge can concern, for example, specific
expertise with respect to informatics, to be used by firms to adjust their production
process, or the use of testing equipment.
The supply of these commodities of knowledge can be arranged in different ways:
like the collaboration with other firms in the innovation process, in this case the
firm has the choice between, on the one hand, contracting out the supply of the
commodity, or organizing a cooperative settlement with a research institute. This
result in a more or less stable relationship that uniquely links the research institute
with the industrial firm. Such a stable relationship safeguards the supply of the
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commodity to the firm, as well as reducing chances of R&D spillover.
Especially in this situation the specific attributes of the innovation and the
environment determine which hazards are involved and, consequently, which type
of arrangement should be followed.
The Eureka program is a special case of such an arrangement. Eureka is an
initiative by various European states to reinforce the common European market by
bringing together European firms and research institutes as well as governmental
agencies to cooperate on R&D. The Eureka program differs from EC programs,
both in management and with respect to its objective to emphasize aspects of the
innovation process near the market (see chapter 2).
Considering the hazards involved, one should expect that only certain types of
projects will be submitted to the Eureka program. I will return to this point below.
Finally, there is a third situation in which firm-research institute R&D cooperation
occurs: the development of what has been called strategic research. Both of the
above mentioned instances of R&D interaction between firms and research insti-
tutes assume a difference in objectives between firms and research institutes. It is
this difference in objectives which sometimes results in collaboration. However,
in recent years a new type of fundamental scientific research has emerged that is
equally important to research institutes and industrial firms: i.e. strategic scientific
research. To a growing extent (and especially in what has become known as ’high-
tech’ firms), firms are directly dependent on new fundamental insights for their
product development. This applies, for example, to biotechnology firms, relying
on specific developments in microbiology; to chip-producing firms relying on
developments in semi-conductor research, or to pharmaceutical industrial firms that
rely upon fundamental research in pharmacology and related fields.
In this case the innovation process is shortcircuited: the transformation from
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fundamental insight to application should take as little time as possible. Moreover,
the fundamental research process should be organized in such a way that the
chances of finding insights at short notice are optimalized.
Given the costs involved, only a very small number of industrial firms are able to
do this kind of strategic research in-house. Hence the significance of collaboration
with research institutes and the high risks involved. It is for this reason that in this
case, special common research programs are established that link specific research
groups with specific industrial firms.
The emergence of this type of scientific research has resulted in a rearrangement
of the relationships between industrial firms and (especially university) research
institutes. Strategic fundamental research is equally important for industrial firms
and research institutes alike. Consequently, the collaborative forms chosen by
firms and research institutes resemble joint ventures between industrial firms8.
However, in this chapter I want to focus on the second of these three situations:
collaboration between research institutes and industrial firms because of the
specific commodities the former offer industrial firms. I refrain from discussing
both the traditional ’pre-competitive’ fundamental research contributions, and the
competitive strategic contributions of research institutes.
If we can accept that there is a category of R&D problems that can be solved by
collaborating with others, then the research question can be stated as follows:
When do industrial firms include research institutes in their collaborative projects
to solve this kind of problems?
8 Strategic fundamental research is important for research institutes, because it is
simultaneously economically and scientifically significant. Furthermore, the costs
involved with most modern strategic research necessitate the collaboration with private
firms (also considering the restricted funds available nowadays). This, of course, will
considerably change the nature of the organization and financing of fundamental
scientific research, see Ziman (1989).
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We proceed from the assumption that the European Eureka program comprises the
type of R&D collaborative projects as indicated above. Because of its objective
to strengthen the European market, little fundamental research is financed within
Eureka. Moreover, the public nature of the program excludes projects related to
strategic fundamental scientific developments. Accordingly, Eureka comprises
cooperative R&D projects in which specific changes of processes or products are
the subject of collaborative R&D projects involving only other industrial firms, or
industrial firms and research institutes. In other words, the Eureka program is an
interesting topic when one wants to study the firm/research institute interaction.
When do firms include research institutes in their collaborative projects, and how
do these projects differ from projects without research institute involvement?
In the following I formulate a theory on R&D cooperation between industrial firms
and research institutes in this specific situation. This theory results in a series of
hypotheses concerning the involvement of research institutes in a program such
as Eureka. Subsequently, information is provided concerning the Eureka program,
as well as the database used to conduct a content analysis of the abstracts of
Eureka projects. In this chapter I present information on two different fields within
the Eureka program: robotics and production automation, and environmental
technology. These fields were chosen because of the apparent differences in terms
of ’research-intensity’. I then consider the empirical information. It is my intention
to test a model explaining the involvement of research institutes within the
cooperative projects which comprises attributes of the innovation and the
environment. Finally, some conclusions are formulated.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
As indicated above, I confine the range of validity of the theory to the situation
in which research firms need to involve external partners (other firms or research
institutes) for specific contributions in the development of new products and
processes. Given the fact that I am using the material of a generic R&D program
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(rather than addressing the specific choices of individual firms) a second proviso
is also necessary. The contributions should, at least indirectly, be relevant for more
than one industrial firm (otherwise the project should not be in a program like
Eureka). In other words, the contributions to the innovative process I am
discussing will have a more or less public character9. Collaborative programs such
as Eureka therefore, have a weak appropriability regime.
Considering these restrictions, the decisions of industrial firms to involve research
institutes in R&D cooperative efforts depend on three different kinds of factors.
These include attributes of
(a) the environment
(b) the firm; i.c. its strategy, and
(c) the innovation.
The environment comprises attributes of the industry and the market in which the
firm operates, as well as the nature of the technological problems faced by firms
in such environments.
The research intensity of the environment affects the decision to involve research
institutes in R&D collaboration. Research intensity refers to the role scientific
research plays in both the production process and the products of industrial firms.
Although research intensity has been increased in most industries in the recent
past, there are still differences between industries with respect to the amount of
scientific research needed to keep the production process up to date, and maintain
a strong competitive position.
Apparently, the degree of research intensity is related to the problems encountered
9 This implies in some cases that the partners in a project indicate via a contract to
what extent they cooperate, and at what stage they leave the collaboration and further
develop the innovation in-house.
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by firms in particular industries. The more these problems need a scientifically
based technology, the more scientific research is needed to maintain an optimal
market position.
One may then hypothesize that in environments with a relatively high research
intensity, more collaboration of firms and research institutes will occur than in
environments in which the research intensity is lower. As indicated above, I did
not assess the degree of research intensity of the two research areas under study.
I assumed that the research intensity of environmental problems would be larger
than that in the field of robotics.
Hypothesis 1: Given the higher research intensity of the area of
’environmental research’, compared to ’robotics’, there will be
more projects with research institute participation in the former,
and less in the latter.
Choices of industrial firms about process or product innovation are embedded in
strategic choices regarding their future and their relationships with their competi-
tors.
As Porter (1983) has indicated, two main dimensions can be distinguished in the
innovative choices of firms: (a) the degree to which a firm chooses to emphasize
either cost reduction or the uniqueness of its product as the main approach of
innovation, and (b) the degree to which the firm follows a strategy of focusing on
a specific sub-market with the innovation, or a strategy of general competition
within the market.
The first dimension partly overlaps with the distinction between process and
product innovations: cost reducing strategies will quite often involve process,
rather than product innovations. Moreover, cost reduction - in contrast to unique-
ness - will involve less radical innovations. Instead, the emphasis will be on small
incremental changes in the production process to make the process more efficient.
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However, emphasizing uniqueness will quite often involve large scale innovations
such as developing a new product for a new market segment. The latter type of
innovations will not frequently be found in programs such as Eureka.
One may hypothesize that the more radical the innovation, the more research
institutes should be involved, keeping in mind that the problem of R&D spillover
will not occur in the case of Eureka type projects. This would mean that the
various strategies can be ranked according to of the radicality of the innovations
to be expected; the different objectives; and, the involvement of research institutes
in the projects. One could then expect an increasing involvement of research
institutes when comparing the various strategies, i.e. from general/cost via
general/unique, focus/cost, to focus/unique.
Hypothesis 2: The various strategies, from general/cost, via
general /unique to focus/cost to focus/unique, can be ranked in
terms of an increasing participation of research institutes in the
projects and involving firms characterized by these strategies.
The third type of factors concern the nature of the project itself. Apparently, a
project that is more fundamental (or at least further away from the market) will
have more research institute involvement.
Hypothesis 3: The larger the distance of projects from the market the
more we will find participation of research institutes.
Furthermore, as indicated above, product innovations will, in general, be more
radical than process innovations and, consequentially, need more input of research
institutes.
Hypothesis 4: Product innovations, more than process innova-
tions, are characterized by research institute involvement.
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Although I have indicated that programs such as Eureka have, by definition, a
weak appropriability regime, there will still be differences within the program as
to the extent to which the innovation is important for a given firm in the project.
We would then expect that, given the risks involved in collaboration with research
institutes, in the case of projects with only one intended exploiting firm the
number of participating research institutes will be relatively low.
Hypothesis 5: In projects were the innovation will be exploited by
only one of the participating firms, the number of participating
research institutes will be relatively low.
Finally, we should add a project related factor, specific for the Eureka program.
As outlined below, the Eureka program has as its objective the strengthening of
the European market by emphasizing R&D cooperation within special fields of
technology. Consequently, within the Eureka program two different types of
projects can be found: 1) projects in which a specific technology is supposed to
be applicable in a new environment; 2) problems for which the technology could
be an adequate answer. In other words, in one type of project, the motivation to
innovate is an existing problem for which an adequate answer must be found. In
the other, firms in a particular technology field (e.g. robotics, informatics, etc.) are
looking for new applications. Here the motivation is not so much the problem but
the technology.
Hypothesis 6: Projects which are motivated by the existence of a
problem rather than the availability of a new technology will be
characterized by larger research institute involvement.
THE DATABASE AND THE CONTENT ANALYSIS
In this chapter I have confined my attention to two of the research areas in the
EUREKA programme: robotics and production automation, and environmental
124
technology. The two areas have approximately the same size (in terms of number
of projects) but differ in terms of research intensity. Earlier data taught that in the
area of environment 45% of the participants are universities and research institutes.
In the area of robotics this is only 15%10. These figures, and my analysis of
project descriptions, suggest that the technology area category is less arbitrary than
Peterson (1993) claims in his study of Eureka.
By comparing these two areas, we could expect that research intensity can be
controlled by separately performing the analyses for both areas. However, we still
have to establish to what extent there actually is a difference between the two
areas in this respect.
Information on all Eureka projects is provided in the ECHO database, located in
Luxembourg. The ECHO database contains information on the project title,
duration, costs, participants and, via an abstract, provides information on the nature
of the projects. At the time of datacollection (May 1992) this database indicated
124 projects in the area of environments and 113 in the area of robotics.
We collected information on the various projects by performing a content analysis
(Weber 1985) of the files of the various projects in the two fields. For a variety
of reasons (such as a lack of information) 7 projects had to be skipped from the
analysis (4 in environment; 3 in robotics).
The content analysis was performed as follows. Independently, three researchers
(the present authors and Dr. S. Zeldenrust) scored the 230 project descriptions on
a list of variables chosen as operationalizations of the concepts indicated above.
The three lists of coded projects were then mutually checked in order to establish
the reliability of the coding. I did not check the validity of the distinctions made
by the researchers by asking the project leaders.
10 Data provided by the Eureka secretariat, june 1990.
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Unfortunately, the varying nature of the information within the database (some
projects have a long detailed abstract, others only have a short description) made
it impossible to make a more detailed analysis of the nature of the projects.
Eventually, information was collected on the following variables:
(1) Intended strategy of firms on the basis of the formulation of
the purposes of the project. The researchers coded all projects
according to general/cost; general/unique; focus/cost and
focus/unique.
(2) Exploitation of the innovation. In order to establish if at least
one of the partners in the cooperation considered the innovation
as significant, I coded according to whether zero, one or more
firms indicated the intention to exploit the innovation.
Four variables were used to indicate the characteristics of the innovation itself:
(3) Product or process innovation. From the point of view of the
central actor (the firm submitting the project proposal) I coded
whether the innovation was a product or a process innovation.
This distinction was not always clear (some firms intended to
develop a new process, but also indicated their intention to market
the process).
(4) Problem or technology motivated. Considering the fact that the
Eureka program is defined in a number of new technology fields,
I assessed to what extent the projects were motivated by an
existing problem, or by the availability of the new technology.
(5) Duration. In the abstract of each Eureka project is indicated
the number of months the project is supposed to last. This
information was used to indicate the duration of the project. I
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assumed that the longer the duration of the project, the larger the
distance would be between the project and the market. In this way
"duration of the project" can be seen as a proxy indicator of the
distance to the market.
The dependent variable (involvement of research institutes) was constructed by
establishing the number of (university and non-university) research institutes parti-
cipating in the projects. I made a distinction between projects with only firm
participation; projects with research institutes in which an industrial firm took the
initiative and projects in which both firms and research institutes participated, but
where the research institute took the initiative. The projects with only research
institutes (and no firm participation, twelve projects) were excuded from the
analysis.
THE ANALYSIS
The first hypothesis (more research intense areas show more research institute
involvement in R&D programs) requires the establishment of the degree of
research intensity of areas. I did not assess the research intensity of the various
areas of Eureka. Rather, on the basis of earlier studies I assumed that the two
areas (environmental problems and robotics) would differ on this dimension. I
expected more research intensity in environmental problems (given the nature of
the problems in this field) than in robotics.
In other words, if my assumption is that environmental problems are more
research intensive than robotics, I should find more research institute involvement
in the former than in the latter sample. The figures for both samples are given in
Table 1.
Table 1 shows that there is a difference in the expected direction between the two
areas: more projects in the area of environmental problems have research institutes
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as initiators, compared to projects in the area of robotics.
In contrast, the number of projects in which only firms participate is slightly
higher in robotics. However, the chi-square for the relationship between the
variables is only significant at the .09 level.
Considering the difference between the two areas, I decided to do the analysis of
the other hypotheses separately for both fields.
Table 1
Distribution of types of actors in EUREKA projects in the areas Environment
and Robotics
Environment Robotics
n % n %
Only firms 43 39.4 48 44.0
Firms and
research institutes 37 33.9 45 41.3
Research institutes
and firms 29 26.6 16 14.7
Totala 109 100 109 100
Chi-sq= 4.81, p=.09
a Twelve projects have been excluded. In these projects only research institutes
participated (11 in environment; 1 in robotics).
Table 2 summarizes the relationships between the various independent variables
and the degree of involvement of research institutes in the Eureka projects. The
table shows that at the zero-order level (no other variables have as yet been held
constant), only in one case could a strongly significant association be found, i.e.,
in the relationship between the intended exploitation of the innovation and the
involvement of research institutes. In the other cases, relationships had to be
specified for the two areas, i.e., the relationship with a focus/cost strategy in the
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case of robotics, and with focus/unique in the case of environmental problems.
Furthermore, an unexpected relationship was found between "research institute
involvement" and the "innovation being a process innovation" in the case of
environmental problems (it was hypothesized that there would be a relationship
with product innovations). However no relationships were found in the cases of
hypotheses three (projects with a longer duration - as an operationalization of the
distance to the market- will have more research institute involvement) and six
(projects with a problem motivation will have more research institute involve-
ment).
The strong association with the exploitation variable requires closer scrutinity.
Table 3 shows the differences in research institute involvement for the various
categories of this variable and for the two areas.
Table 3 shows (for both areas) that research institutes are relatively more often
initiators of projects for that category of innovations for which no indications have
as yet been given about the exploitation. This was expected: industrial firms are
only participants in such projects. Although interested, they apparently did not
consider the topics as centrally important (if that had been the case, they would
have initiated the projects).
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Table 2
The correlation between various independent variables and involvement of
research institutesa in EUREKA programs, for two areas: environmental
problems and robotics.
Environment Robotics
Chi-sq p Chi-sq p
Hyp.2:
Strat gen/cost 1.07 n.s. .02 n.s.
Strat gen/unique .43 n.s. .01 n.s.
Strat foc/cost .96 n.s. 3.01 .08
Strat foc/unique 3.90 .05 1.30 n.s.
Hyp.3:
Duration 1.51 n.s. 3.21 n.s.
Hyp.4:
Process innovation 3.00 .08 .16 n.s.
Product innovation 1.51 n.s. .02 n.s.
Hyp.5:
Exploitation 15.42 .001 17.25 .001
Hyp.6:
Motiv. Problem .07 n.s. .54 n.s.
Motiv. Technology .21 n.s. .51 n.s.




The association between the intended exploitation of the innovation and
research institute participation in EUREKA projects for the areas of
environmental problems and robotics
Environment Robotics
ind ind & res & ind ind & res &
res ind res ind
n n n n n n
% % % % % %
Exploitation by:
No decision 10 11 16 12 11 8
23.3 29.7 55.2 25.0 24.4 50.0
One firm 6 6 3 15 9 3
14.0 16.2 10.3 31.3 20.0 18.8
More firms 7 14 7 6 2 4
16.3 37.8 24.1 12.5 46.7 25.0
All firms 20 6 3 15 4 1
46.5 16.2 10.3 31.3 8.9 6.3
Environmental problems:
Chi-Square Value DF Significance
20.32250 6 .00243
Robotics:
Chi-Square Value DF Significance
21.96506 6 .00123
The chi-squares are different from the figures in Table 2, because of the fact that
the research involvement table was dichotomized in the case of Table 2.
The nature of Eureka projects - in terms of weak appropriability - adequately
indicated that in the category where more industrial firms intend to exploit the
innovation, relatively more projects are found in which industrial firms find re-
search institutes to participate. Moreover, if we take the projects with only
industrial firm participation, all of these firms often have decided to exploit the
innovation. In this respect there is also no significant difference between the two
areas.
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Only in the projects where one firm is considered the exploiter of the innovation,
in the case of robotics relatively more ’only firms’ collaboration is found.
Once more, this underscores the difference between the two areas (one may
suppose that in the area of robotics more ’normal’ innovation projects are found
(one or more firms developing a new process, and collaborating with a supplier
(or suppliers) of the components). In that case it is to be expected that the supplier
will exploit the innovation.
In general, I conclude that these results underline the special nature of innovations
submitted to a program such as Eureka. These innovations are not expected to
contribute to the individual competitiveness of firms, but are more generically
interesting improvements that are equally interesting to more firms.
There is one important difference between the two areas with respect to the type
of strategy related to a different involvement of the research institutes (a
focus/unique versus a focus/cost approach in, respectively the areas environmental
problems and robotics).
Logistic regression analyses for both areas show that only these two variables (in
the two areas) have a significant separate effect aside from the exploitation
variable on research involvement in the Eureka projects (the association between
process innovations and research institute involvement in the case of environ-
mental projects appeared to be spurious).
In both cases, the more the project can be classified as starting from a
focus/unique (in the environment area), respectively a focus/cost strategy (in the
robotics area), the less research institutes are represented in the projects.
The more the firms emphasize a focused approach to the market (related to their
innovative endeavours) the closer the innovative process will be to the market, and
the less significant the contribution of research institutes.
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It is clear from the difference in nature between the two areas that in the one
(robotics) the emphasis will be on cost reduction, and in the other (environment)
on uniqueness. In the latter area many firms attempt to find their own niche in this
new market of environmental technologies. This interpretation is supported by the
strong negative association (R=-.29; p=.02) between my operationalization of the
distance to the market (the duration of the project) and the focus/unique in the
case of the environmental projects. A similar relationship could not be found in
the case of the focus/cost strategy in the robotics projects. This can be a
consequence of the small number of projects with this strategy (10 in the case of
robotics; 4 in the case of environmental projects).
CONCLUSIONS
The Eureka program has as its central objective the reinforcement of the European
market, by stimulating the collaboration of firms with respect to innovation.
Notwithstanding this objective, many research institutes participate in the Eureka
projects. Other studies already indicated that a large number of Eureka projects is
not so "close to the market".It was my objective in this chapter, to show that the
degree of research institute involvement is related to specific attributes of the
projects. The analysis in the former paragraph showed that one factor in particular
accounted for differences in research institute participation: the nature of the
exploitation envisaged. But, in contrast to theories on choices of firms, related to
innovative behaviour and cooperation with others; the effects of the exploitation
variable could only be formulated in terms of the specific characteristics of
innovations within a program such as Eureka. Apparently, there is a special
category of innovations which firms want to share with others. This has partly to
do with the fact that one is either not yet in a situation to discuss the exploitation
of the innovation (and in that situation research institutes participate relatively
more), or in a situation in which the exploitation of the innovation is equally
interesting for all participants in the project. In the latter case, research institutes
are underrepresented. Apparently, the industrial firms do not then need the
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research institutes. This is the more so because at the same time they appear to
follow a focused strategic approach; either directed toward cost reduction (in
robotics) or to develop specific niches in the new market of environmental
technologies.
In order to develop a technology as a means in a focused strategy, it is necessary
to be quite sure about the potential contributions of the technology. Hence, the
lesser role of research institutes.
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